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Abstract
In 1986 David Gauthier proposed an arbitration scheme for two player
cardinal bargaining games based on interpersonal comparisons of play-
ers’ relative concessions. In Gauthier’s original arbitration scheme, play-
ers’ relative concessions are defined in terms of Raiffa-normalized cardinal
utility gains, and so it cannot be directly applied to ordinal bargaining
problems. In this paper I propose a relative benefit equilibrating bar-
gaining solution (RBEBS) for two and n-player ordinal and quasiconvex
ordinal bargaining problems with finite sets of feasible basic agreements
based on the measure of players’ ordinal relative individual advantage
gains. I provide an axiomatic characterization of this bargaining solu-
tion and discuss the conceptual relationship between RBEBS and ordinal
egalitarian bargaining solution (OEBS) proposed by Conley and Wilkie
(2012). I show the relationship between the measurement procedure for
ordinal relative individual advantage gains and the measurement proce-
dure for players’ ordinal relative concessions, and argue that the proposed
arbitration scheme for ordinal games can be interpreted as an ordinal
version of Gauthier’s arbitration scheme.
1 Introduction
Experiments with bargaining games suggest that information concerning the dis-
tribution of the bargaining gains among real-world decision-makers plays a role
in their search for mutually agreeable solutions of bargaining problems. For ex-
ample, a more recent extensive experimental study carried out by Herreiner and
Puppe (2009) suggests that people are willing to trade strict Pareto efficiency
for a more equitable distribution of the individual bargaining gains. It is fairly
obvious that such "fairness" considerations inevitably involve some kind of inter-
personal comparison of decision-makers’ individual bargaining gains. Standard
inequity aversion models, such as the one proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
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can be used to represent decision-maker’s aversion to inequitable distributions
of material bargaining gains via appropriate transformations of decision-makers’
Von Neumann and Morgenstern expected utility functions (for details, see Fehr
and Schmidt 1999). They cannot, however, be used to represent decision-
makers’ attitudes towards interpersonal comparisons of their utility gains.
The orthodox expected utility theory does not imply the interpersonal com-
parability of numbers representing decision-makers’ Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern utility (for an extensive discussion of why this is so, see Luce and Raiffa
1957). It means that any interpretation of Von Neumann and Morgenstern
utility function as a function representing interpersonally comparable levels of
players’ welfare gains goes beyond the uses of the utility representation which
can be theoretically justified in terms of the orthodox expected utility theory
(see Hammond 1991 and Binmore 2009). However, Raiffa (1953) has suggested
a utility function normalization procedure which allows for abstract compar-
isons of decision-makers’ relative utility gains. According to this normalization
procedure, the relative utility gain from a bargaining outcome can be defined
as the extent by which that outcome advances the decision-maker’s personal
utility from his/her reference point relative to the utopia point – the bargaining
outcome associated with the maximum possible decision-maker’s personal util-
ity gain. Raiffa normalization is an abstract formal procedure which allows to
establish a meaningful interpersonal comparison of decision-makers’ individual
utility gains in bargaining problems where comparisons of numbers representing
decision-makers’ utility gains are not initially meaningful (Raiffa 1953, Luce and
Raiffa 1957). In other words, Raiffa normalization does not require decision-
makers’ utility numbers to be associated with any meaningfully interpersonally
comparable notion of well-being or welfare (in fact, the numbers representing
payoffs need not have any substantive meaning at all for the normalization pro-
cedure to yield meaningful information), and so its application is compatible
with the expected utility theory (for extensive discussion, see Luce and Raiffa
1957, Hausman 1995).
In Morals by Agreement (1986), Gauthier suggested an arbitration scheme
based on interpersonal comparisons of decison-makers’ relative concessions for
two player bargaining problems in which the set of feasible agreements is a
closed convex hull1. A relative concession associated with a particular bargain-
ing outcome was defined as the difference between decision-maker’s maximum
possible Raiffa-normalized utility gain (utopia payoff) and the actual Raiffa-
normalized utility gain associated with that bargaining outcome. Gauthier’s
minimax bargaining solution is a bargaining agreement which minimizes the
maximum relative concession among the interacting decision-makers.
However, Gauthier’s solution can only be applied to cardinal bargaining
games, and Gauthier himself has offered no suggestions of how an arbitra-
tion scheme based on comparisons of bargainers’ relative concessions could be
applied to ordinal bargaining games. In this paper I suggest an arbitration
1That is, the set of feasible agreements is defined over a set of lotteries over the set of
possible allocations of a finite resource.
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scheme based on comparisons of decision-makers’ ordinal relative individual
benefit gains, which can be applied in ordinal and quasiconvex ordinal bargain-
ing games with a finite set of basic feasible agreements2. I propose an ordinal
relative benefit equilibrating bargaining solution (later abbreviated as RBEBS )
for ordinal and quasiconvex ordinal two and n-player bargaining games, and
provide an axiomatic characterization of this bargaining solution. Finally, I
show that the RBEBS of quasiconvex bargaining problems is formally equiva-
lent to Conley and Wilkie ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite sets
of Pareto optimal points (OEBS ), yet the equivalence relation between RBEBS
and OEBS does not hold in purely ordinal bargaining games. I also show that
the RBEBS solution can always be defined in terms of players’ ordinal rela-
tive concessions, and so the RBEBS can be interpreted as an ordinal version of
Gauthier’s minimax bargaining solution.
2 The Ordinal RBEBS
2.1 The intuition behind the procedure for the measure-
ment of ordinal relative individual benefit gains
In every bargaining situation a rational negotiator aims to maximize his/her in-
dividual benefit gains from a bargaining agreement. Each bargainer’s individual
benefit gains would be maximized if his/her most preferred feasible agreement
were chosen to be implemented by the interacting parties. If bargainers have
conflicting preferences over the feasible agreements (as it is the case in all the
standard bargaining problems where bargainers negotiate over a set of feasible
distributions of some (possibly imperfectly) divisible resource), an agreement
can realistically be reached if at least one bargainer makes a concession – agrees
with the implementation of a feasible agreement which is worse than his/her
most preferred feasible agreement. In other words, in order for an agreement
to be reached, at least one of the bargainers needs to ’give up’ demanding the
implementation of at least one feasible agreement (for an extensive discussion
of the logic of concessional bargaining, see Zhang and Zhang 2008).
In standard ordinal bargaining problems, decision-makers are assumed not
to have information about each other’s preferences over the lotteries over the
set of feasible agreements. This assumption implies that decision-makers do not
know each other’s Von Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions representing
their cardinal preferences over the feasible agreements3. However, bargainers’
ordinal preferences over feasible agreements are assumed to be common knowl-
2That is, to ordinal and quasiconvex ordinal bargaining games where the set of feasible
allocations of some (possibly imperfectly) divisible resource is finite.
3An ordinal representation of the bargaining problem does not imply that decision-makers’
preferences over the feasible agreements cannot, at least in principle, be represented by Von
Neumann and Morgenstern utility functions. It only implies that players negotiate in an
epistemic situation where the cardinal information about preferences is not available to them,
and so an arbitration scheme must be based on bargainers’ ordinal preferences over the set of
feasible agreements.
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edge. This epistemic assumption implies that each bargainer knows every other
bargainer’s ordinal preferential ranking of feasible agreements, knows that every
other bargainer knows this, knows that every bargainer knows that every other
bargainer knows this, and so on ad infinitum4. If each decision-maker’s ordinal
ranking of feasible agreements is common knowledge, then each bargainer must
know a subset of feasible agreements that each of the bargainers strictly prefers
over any particular feasible agreement. If the set of feasible agreements is finite,
then, for any feasible agreement x, every bargainer must also be able to deter-
mine the number of alternative feasible agreements that each of the bargainers
strictly prefers over x. More technically, for any feasible agreement x, every
bargainer must know every other bargainer’s cardinality of the preferred set of
alternatives associated with x – the number of feasible agreements that every
other bargainer strictly prefers over x. By letting S to denote a set of feasible
agreements and x; y 2 S to denote any two feasible agreements, we can define,
for each bargainer, the cardinality of the preferred set of feasible agreements
associated with some agreement x 2 S in the following way:
c (x;S) = fjT j , where y 2 T iff y 2 S ^ y  xg : (1)
A rational bargainer always strictly prefers a feasible agreement y associated
with a smaller cardinality of the preferred set of alternatives to any feasible
agreement x associated with a larger cardinality of the preferred set of alterna-
tives. A bargainer who aims to maximize his/her individual benefit gains thus
seeks an implementation of an agreement which minimizes the cardinality of
the preferred set of alternatives. Each bargainer’s cardinality of the preferred
set of alternatives associated with some feasible agreement x can be interpreted
as a measure of the size of bargainer’s concession: It represents the number
of preferred feasible agreements that the bargainer would forego if the feasible
agreement x were chosen to be implemented. Each bargainer’s ordinal relative
concession associated with some agreement x can thus be defined as the ratio
of the difference between bargainer’s minimum possible concession and the con-
cession associated with some agreement x to the difference between bargainer’s
minimum possible concession and the maximum possible concession. By letting
c (x) to denote the cardinality of the preferred set of alternatives associated with
agreement x, cmax to denote the maximum possible cardinality of the preferred
set of alternatives, and cmin to denote the minimum possible cardinality of the
preferred set of alternatives, we can define bargainer’s ordinal relative concession
associated with some feasible agreement x in the following way:
ro =
cmin   c (x)
cmin   cmax : (2)
Since the minimum possible cardinality of the preferred set of alternatives is
associated with bargainer’s most preferred feasible agreement, it is, by definition
4For an extensive technical discussion of how common knowledge assumptions can be
formally represented by infinite belief hierarchies, see Perea 2012.
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of cardinality of the preferred set of alternatives, always 0. Therefore, the ordinal
relative concession definition can be simplified in the following way:
ro =
0  c (x)
0  cmax =
 c (x)
 cmax =
c (x)
cmax
: (3)
Since bargainer’s concession associated with some agreement x is the number
of preferred feasible agreements that s/he would have to give up if the feasi-
ble agreement x were chosen to be implemented, bargainer’s ordinal individual
benefit gain associated with x can be defined as the number of feasible agree-
ments that s/he would not have to give up if x were chosen to be implemented.
Bargainer’s ordinal relative individual benefit gain associated with a feasible
agreement x can thus be defined as a ratio of the difference between bargainer’s
maximum possible concession and the concession associated with x to the dif-
ference between bargainer’s maximum and minimum possible concessions:
bo =
cmax   c (x)
cmax   cmin =
cmax   c (x)
cmax   0 =
cmax   c (x)
cmax
: (4)
Thus, a measurement of bargainer’s ordinal concessions can be used to derive
a measure of bargainers’ individual benefit gains, and thus serve as a basis for
an arbitration scheme based on comparisons of bargainers’ ordinal individual
advantage gains. RBEBS is based on an arbitration scheme which recommends
an implementation of a feasible agreement which minimizes the difference be-
tween bargainers’ ordinal relative individual benefit gains. Since RBEBS will,
by definition, be a feasible agreement which minimizes the difference between
bargainers’ ordinal relative concessions, it can be viewed as an ordinal interpre-
tation of Gauthier’s minimax bargaining solution.
2.2 Formal characterization of the ordinal RBEBS for two
player bargaining problems
Let Bo =

f1; 2g ; fA; dg ; figi21;2

be a two player ordinal bargaining game
where A is the set of possible agreements and d = fd1; d2g is the disagreement
point. Each player i 2 f1; 2g has a complete, transitive and reflexive preference
relation i over the set of possible agreements A. Each agreement xi 2 A is
a pair of demands xi = (g1; g2) over some amount of (possibly imperfectly)
divisible resource5, the total amount of which is z. Each demand gi of every
5Here I follow Sakovicks (2004) and Conley and Wilkie (2012) by defining the set of feasi-
ble basic agreements as a set of feasible physical allocations of some divisible resource. The
proposed ordinal solution operates on assumption that a set of feasible basic allocations of
resource is finite. This condition may be satisfied for two reasons. First, a resource may be
imperfectly divisible, and so the players have to choose among a finite number of possible
divisions of resource (e.g. a dollar can only be divided into a finite number of possible distri-
butions). Second, the players may not be able to implement all the infinite agreements due to
some external factors unrelated to the divisibility of the resource itself. The RBEBS solution
can be applied to any ordinal game with a finite set of feasible agreements.
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i 2 f1; 2g is selected from the interval [di; :::; z]. Let S  A be a subset of
feasible agreements of Bo which can be defined as follows:
S = fxi = (g1; g2) 2 S : g1 + g2 = z ^ xi i d8i 2 f1; 2gg : (5)
From (5) it follows that xi 2 S if and only if a pair of demands (g1; g2) is a Nash
equilibrium.
For any pair xi = (g1; g2) 2 S and xj 6=i = (h1; h2) 2 S, such that hi > gi,
the preferences of i 2 f1; 2g are such that hi i gi, and so xj i xi. Since every
xi 2 S is such that g1 + g2 2 S, each player i 2 f1; 2g has a strict preference
relation i over S  A.
Suppose that Bo is such that A 6= ; and S  A is a finite set of agreements.
In line with the standard interpretation of bargaining problems, the disagree-
ment point will be treated as a feasible outcome, and so the set of considered
feasible outcomes will be defined as fS; dg := S [ fdg. For each i 2 f1; 2g,
the cardinality of the preferred set of agreements associated with some feasible
agreement xi 2 S can be defined in the following way:
ci (xi; fS; dg) = fjT j , where xj 6=i 2 T ) xj 2 fS; dg ^ xj  xig : (6)
From (6) it follows that xj 6=i i xi if and only if ci (xj ; fS; dg) < ci (xi; fS; dg).
Let cmaxi (fS; dg) := arg maxxi2fS;dg [ci (xi; fS; dg)] be the maximum pos-
sible concession of player i 2 f1; 2g associated with some outcome in the set
fS; dg. Since, for every i 2 f1; 2g, it is the case that xi i di 8xi 2 S, it
follows that cmaxi (fS; dg) = ci (d) for every i 2 f1; 2g. Let cmini (fS; dg) :=
arg minxi2fS;dg [ci (xi; fS; dg)] be the minimum possible concession of player
i 2 f1; 2g associated with some outcome in the set fS; dg. Since every xi =
(g1; g2) 2 S is such that g1 + g2 = z, it follows that agreements associated with
players’ minimum concessions are (z; d2) and (d1; z), and so, from the structure
of Bo and fS; dg, it follows that cmini (fS; dg) = 0 for every i 2 f1; 2g.
Let roi (yi; fS; dg) 2 [0; 1] denote an ordinal relative concession of player
i 2 f1; 2g associated with some feasible outcome yi 2 fS; dg. Player’s ordinal
relative concession associated with yi 2 fS; dg can be defined as follows:
roi (yi; fS; dg) =
cmini (fS; dg)  ci (yi; fS; dg)
cmini (fS; dg)  cmaxi (fS; dg)
: (7)
Since cmini (fS; dg) = 0 and cmaxi (fS; dg) = ci (d) for every i 2 f1; 2g, (7) can
be simplified as follows:
roi (yi; fS; dg) =
 ci (yi; fS; dg)
 ci (d) =
ci (yi; fS; dg)
ci (d)
: (8)
Let boi (yi; fS; dg) 2 [0; 1] denote an ordinal relative individual benefit gain of
player i 2 f1; 2g associated with some feasible outcome yi 2 fS; dg. Since
the individual benefit gain represents the number of total possible concessions
that i 2 f1; 2g does not make if outcome y 2 fS; dg obtains, a relative ordinal
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individual benefit gain of player i 2 f1; 2g associated with yi 2 fS; dg can be
defined as follows:
boi (yi; fS; dg) =
cmaxi (fS; dg)  ci (y; fS; dg)
cmaxi (fS; dg)  cmini (fS; dg)
: (9)
Since cmini (fS; dg) = 0 and cmaxi (fS; dg) = ci (d) for every i 2 f1; 2g, (9) can
be simplified as follows:
boi (yi; fS; dg) =
ci (d)  ci (yi; fS; dg)
ci (d)
: (10)
The ordinal RBEBS function 'o () satisfies, for every fS; dg,
'o (fS; dg) 2 arg minxi2S
 boi (xi; fS; dg)  boj 6=i (xi; fS; dg) : (11)
From (10) it follows that, for every i 2 f1; 2g,
boi (xi; fS; dg) = 1 
ci (xi; fS; dg)
ci (d)
8x 2 S: (12)
From (8) and (12) it follows that, for every i 2 f1; 2g,
boi (xi; fS; dg) = 1  roi (xi; fS; dg)8xi 2 S: (13)
In terms of ordinal relative concessions, the RBEBS function 'o () can be
defined as follows:
'o (fS; dg) = arg minxi2S
(1  roi (xi; fS; dg))   1  roj 6=i (xi; fS; dg) ;
(14)
which can be simplified to
'o (fS; dg) = arg minxi2S
roi (xi; fS; dg)  roj 6=i (xi; fS; dg) : (15)
2.3 Axiomatic characterization
The ordinal RBEBS has a number of desirable properties:
Existence in non-trivial cases: RBEBS exists in every ordinal bargaining
game with at least one feasible agreement.
If xi 2 A is a feasible agreement, it follows that S 6= ;. Since 'o (fS; dg) :
fS; dg ! P (S) for any fA; dg, it follows that 'o = ; in every Bo, such that
S 6= ;.
Pareto optimality: RBEBS is always a Pareto optimal agreement.
Let Spo  A denote a set of Pareto optimal agreements which can be defined
as follows:
Swpo = fxi 2 S : 8i 2 f1; 2g ; xi i xj 6=i8xj 2 Sg : (16)
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From (16) it follows that xi = (g1; g2) 2 S ) g1+g2 = z. If g1+g2 = z, it follows
that (g1; g2)  (g1; z   g1)  (z   g2; g2). It follows that @hi 2 [d1; z] : hi >
gi^z hi  z gi, which implies that @hi 2 [d1; z] : hi i gi^z hi j 6=i z gi,
and so, for any xi = (g1; g2), if g1 + g2 = z, then xi 2 Spo. It follows that
x 2 S ) x 2 Spo. Since 'o (fS; dg) : fS; dg ! P (S) for any fA; dg, it follows
that 'o fS; dg 2 P (Spo) for any fA; dg, such that S 6= ;.
Individual rationality: RBEBS is always individually rational.
Suppose that fo () : fA; dg ! P (A) is some ordinal solution function. It will
satisfy the individual rationality axiom iff, for any fA; dg := A [ fdg,
fo : fA; dg ! P (A) : xi i di8xi 2 P (S) : (17)
From (5) it follows that xi 2 S iff xi i di8i 2 f1; 2g. Since 'o : fS; dg ! P (S)
for every fA; dg, it follows that, for every fA; dg, 'o : fS; dg ! P (S) : 8i 2
f1; 2g ; xi i di8xi 2 P (S).
Invariance under additions of Pareto irrelevant agreements: For any
two ordinal bargaining problems Bo and B0o, such that Apo = A0po, it is
always the case that 'o fS; dg = 'o (S 0; d).
Note that xi =2 Apo ) 9xj 6=i 2 A : xj i xi ^ xj j 6=i xi. It follows that
xi = (g1; g2) 2 Apo ) g1 + g2 = z , xi = (g1; g1) 2 S ) g1 + g2 = z and
xi 2 Spo ) xi 2 S ^xi 2 Apo. It follows that @xi 2 Apo : xi 2 S ^xi =2 Spo and
@xi 2 Apo : xi =2 S ^ xi 2 Spo, and so Apo = Spo = S.
Let Bo and B0o be two ordinal bargaining problems, such that A0  A
and Apo = A0po. It follows that S = S 0 and Spo = S 0po. Notice that 'o :
fS; dg ) P (S). Since S = Spo it follows that ' : fS; dg ) P (Spo). Since
Apo = S = Spo = A0po = S 0 = S 0po, it follows that 'o fS; dg = 'o fS 0; dg.
2.4 Application to quasiconvex two player ordinal bar-
gaining problems
In a two player bargaining problem where the number of feasible agreements is
odd and both players have a strict preferential ordering of outcomes in fS; dg,
the RBEBS is a unique feasible agreement x 2 S, such that
bo1 (xi; fS; dg) = bo2 (xi; fS; dg) : (18)
In terms of relative ordinal concessions, x 2 S must be such that
ro1 (xi; fS; dg) = ro2 (xi; fS; dg) ; (19)
which will only be the case if
c1 (xi; fS; dg) = c2 (xi; fS; dg) : (20)
The RBEBS solution will therefore be formally equivalent to the ordinal egali-
tarian bargaining solution for finite sets of Pareto optimal points suggested by
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Agreement b1 (xi; fS; dg) b2 (xi; fS; dg)
(5; 0) 1 0
(4; 1) 0.8 0.2
(3; 2) 0.6 0.4
(2; 3) 0.4 0.6
(1; 4) 0.2 0.8
(0; 5) 0 1
(0; 0) 0 0
Table 1: Discrete Divide the Cake game with an even number of feasible agree-
ments.
Conley and Wilkie (2012). However, the RBEBS solution will not be unique in
bargaining problem with an even number of feasible agreements. For example,
consider the discrete Divide the Cake game depicted in Table 1, in which play-
ers have to agree on how to share 5 pieces of “pie”. Agreement (0; 0) represents
the outcome associated with a disagreement point, as well as outcome associ-
ated with a Pareto inefficient Nash equilibrium, in which both players demand
5 pieces of “pie”. This bargaining problem has two feasible agreements which
minimize the difference between players’ ordinal relative individual benefit gains
– (3; 2) and (2; 3). This is a case of a bargaining problem in which the available
information about players’ ordinal preferences over a finite set of feasible phys-
ical allocations of resource is not sufficient to define a unique solution of the
bargaining problem. According to the arbitration scheme suggested by Conley
and Wilkie, the players could resolve the problem with a fair lottery over the
two agreements which minimize the difference between players’ cardinalities of
the preferred sets of alternatives (i.e. the difference between players’ ordinal
concessions) (for details, see Conley and Wilkie 2012). However, such an arbi-
tration scheme requires additional information about players’ attitudes towards
lotteries over feasible physical allocations of resource. If the required additional
information is not available to the interacting parties, an arbitration scheme
involving a non-degenerate lottery (i.e. a lottery over more than one feasible
physical allocation of resource) cannot be conceptually justified6.
The ordinal RBEBS, however, can be applied to quasiconvex ordinal bargain-
ing problems if players’ attitudes to lotteries satisfy a number of basic axioms.
Let L (S) denote a set of lotteries over the finite set S  A of feasible
alternative agreements (i.e. a finite set of feasible basic allocations of resource)
containing m > 0 elements. Let L = (p1; :::; pm;x1; :::; xm) denote a particular
lottery in L (S), where (p1; :::; pm) is a probability distribution over the set
S = fx1; :::; xmg and xi2f1;:::;mg 2 S is some basic feasible agreement in S. The
support of each L 2 L (S) can be defined in the following way:
Supp (L) = fxi 2 Supp (L) : p (xi) > 0g : (21)
6According to the standard interpretation of axiomatic bargaining solutions, an arbitration
scheme is considered to be “fair” only if it operates on the basis of information available to
the interacting parties. For discussion, see Myerson 1991, Luce and Raiffa 1957.
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The goal is to provide a set of axioms representing a set of preference domain
restrictions that are necessary for a construction of an ordinal representation of
players’ preferences over the set of basic lotteries over the finite set of feasible
allocations of resource. The set of axioms suggested here is a variation of axioms
which for the same purposes have been suggested by Karni and Schmeidler
(1991), Grant and Kajii (1995), Dhillon and Mertens (1999) and Conley and
Wilkie (2012).
Archimedean Axiom (AA): For any triple xi; xj 6=i; xk 6=j 6=i 2 S, such that
xi i xj i xk, there always exists a unique p 2 [0; 1], such that pxi +
(1  p)xk i xj for every i 2 f1; 2g.
Preservation of Certainty Ordering (PCO): For any pair xi; xj 6=i 2 S,
such that xi i xj , and any p 2 (0; 1), it is the case that xi i pxi +
(1  p)x0j i xj for every i 2 f1; 2g.
Preference Continuity (PC ): For any pair xi; xj 6=i 2 S, such that xi i xj ,
and any pair of lotteries L = pxi + (1  p)xj and L0 = qxi + (1  q)xj ,
such that p > q, it must be the case that L i L0 for every i 2 f1; 2g.
First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD): For any pair xi; xj 2 S, such
that xi i xj , and any L 2 L (S), if 1  p > q  0 and L0 = pxi+(1  p)L
and L00 = qxj + (1  q)L , then L0 i L00 for every i 2 f1; 2g.
Quasiconvexity (QC ): For any pair L;L0 2 L (S), such that L i L0, for
any p 2 [0; 1], it is the case that L i pL+ (1  p)L0 for every i 2 f1; 2g.
Strict Dominance of Basic Alternatives (SDBA): For any pair xi; xj 6=i 2
S and any pair L;L0 2 L (S), such that xi i L and xj i L0, then, for
any p 2 [0; 1], it is the case that pxi + (1  p)xj i pL + (1  p)L0 for
every i 2 f1; 2g.
Suppose that players’ preferences satisfy AA, PCO , PC , FOSD , QC and
SDBA axioms and this is common knowledge among the interacting parties.
A quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problem can be defined as a triple
Bqo =
n
L (S) ; d; figi2f1;2g
o
; (22)
where L (S) is the set of lotteries over S  A, d = fd1; d2g is the disagreement
point and i is player i’s preference relation over L (S). As in the purely ordinal
case, it will be assumed that the preferences of every player i 2 f1; 2g are such
that L i di8L 2 L (S).
The set of considered outcomes will be defined as fL (S) ; dg := L (S)[ fdg.
Let xi; xj 6=i 2 S be a pair of feasible agreements, such that x i xj for player
i 2 f1; 2g. Recall that in purely ordinal case the preferences of player i 2 f1; 2g
over S  A are such that, for any pair xi; xj 6=i 2 S, xi i xj 6=i if and only if
ci (xi; fS; dg) < ci (xj ; fS; dg).
Let L = pxi + (1  p)xj be a basic lottery over pair xi; xj 2 S, where
p 2 (0; 1). From PCO axiom it follows that a preference relation of i 2 f1; 2g
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must be such that xi i pxi + (1  p)xj i xj . Let L;L0 2 L (S) be a pair of
lotteries over xi; xj 6=i 2 S , such that L = pxi+(1  p)xj , L0 = qxi+(1  q)xj
and 1  p > q  0. From PC axiom it follows that L i L0 for every i 2 f1; 2g.
It is easy to check that this preference relation over a pair of basic lotteries will
be preserved if, in terms of cardinalities of the preferred sets of alternatives,
players’ preferences over basic lotteries will be defined in the following way:
ci (L; fL (S) ; dg) = pci (xi; fS; dg) + (1  p) ci (xj ; fS; dg) ; (23)
ci (L0; fL (S) ; dg) = qci (xi; fS; dg) + (1  q) ci (xj ; fS; dg) : (24)
Since
ci (xi; fS; dg) < ci (xj ; fS; dg) ^ p > q; (25)
it follows that
ci (L; fL (S) ; dg) < ci (L0; fL (S) ; dg) ; (26)
and so
L i L08i 2 f1; 2g : (27)
Thus, for each player i 2 f1; 2g, the ordinal ranking of any lottery
L = fp1; :::; pm;x1; :::; xmg, such that L 2 L (S), can be defined in terms of
cardinalities of the preferred sets of alternative agreements associated with each
element of the finite set S = (x1; :::; xm) (i.e. with each feasible basic allocation
of a divisible resource):
ci (L; fL (S) ; dg) =
X
xi2fx1;:::;xmg
pici (xi; fS; dg) : (28)
Let bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) 2 [0; 1] denote the ordinal relative individual benefit gain
of player i 2 f1; 2g associated with some lottery L 2 L (S) which, in terms of
cardinalities of the preferred sets of alternatives, can be defined in the following
way:
bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) =
ci (d)  ci (L; fL (S) ; dg)
ci (d)
: (29)
Let L (S)po  L (S) denote a set of Pareto optimal lotteries over S  A which
can be defined in the following way:
L (S)po = fL 2 L (S) : 8i 2 f1; 2g ;L (S) i L0 (S)8L0 2 L (S)g ; (30)
which, in terms of cardinalities of the preferred sets of alternative agreements,
is equivalent to
L (S)po =
fL 2 L (S) : 8i 2 f1; 2g ; ci (L; fL (S) ; dg)  ci (L; fL (S) ; dg)8L0 2 L (S)g
(31)
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which implies that, in terms of players’ ordinal relative individual advantage
gains,
L (S)po =
fL 2 L (S) : 8i 2 f1; 2g ; bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg)  bqoi (L0; fL (S) ; dg)8L0 2 L (S)g :
(32)
In quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problems, the RBEBS function 'qo ()
satisfies, for every fL (S) ; dg,
'qo 2 arg minL2L(S)po
hbqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg)  bqoj 6=i (L; fL (S) ; dg)i : (33)
Let rqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) 2 [0; 1] denote the ordinal relative concession of player
i 2 f1; 2g associated with some lottery L 2 L (S). From (29) it follows that
rqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) = 1  bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg)8L 2 L (S) : (34)
In terms of ordinal relative concessions, the RBEBS function 'qo () can be
defined as follows:
'qo (fL (S) ; dg) 2
arg minL2L(S)po [jri (L; fL (S) ; dg)  rj 6=i (L; fL (S) ; dg)j] : (35)
It is straightforward to check that RBEBS function for quasiconvex bargain-
ing problems satisfies all the axioms that are satisfied by the RBEBS of purely
ordinal bargaining problems. However, in quasiconvex ordinal bargaining prob-
lems, RBEBS also satisfies a specific version of symmetry axiom:
Ex ante symmetry: In any quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problem, RBEBS
is a lottery, such that, ex ante,
ci ('
qo (L; fL (S) ; dg)) = cj 6=i ('qo (L; fL (S) ; dg)) : (36)
Let }i : fS; dg ! Z+ denote an ordinal ranking function of player i 2 f1; 2g
which maps every yi 2 fS; dg into a set of positive integers in the following way:
}i (yi; fS; dg) = ci (yi; fS; dg) + 1: (37)
An ordinal bargaining problem Bo is symmetric if and only if, for every pair
hi; gi 2 S, such that }i (hi; fS; dg) = }j 6=i (gi; fS; dg), it is always the case
that ci (hi; fS; dg) = cj (gi; fS; dg). If an ordinal bargaining problem is sym-
metric, it follows that ci (d; fS; dg) = cj 6=i (d; fS; dg). Suppose that the set
S = fx1; :::; xmg is finite. If the bargaining problem is symmetric, then the
following must be the case:X
xi2S
ci (xi; fS; dg) =
X
xi2S
cj 6=i (xi; fS; dg) = C: (38)
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Notice that the value of function 'qo (fS; dg) will be minimized when
bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) = bqoj 6=i (L; fL (S) ; dg) : (39)
This will be the case if
ci (d) 
 P
xi2S pici (xi; fS; dg)

ci (d)
=
cj 6=i (d) 
 P
xi2S picj (xi; fS; dg)

cj (d)
: (40)
Since ci (d) = cj 6=i (d), it follows that an RBEBS must be a lottery L 2 L (S),
such that X
xi2S
pici (xi; fS; dg) =
X
xi2S
picj 6=i (xi; fS; dg) = C
2
: (41)
Let c (S) denote the cardinality of S  A which can be defined as follows:
c (S) = fjT j , where xi 2 T ) xi 2 S g : (42)
The RBEBS must be a lottery L 2 L (S), such that
'qo (fS; dg) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
xi 2 S : 8i 2 f1; 2g ;
ci (xi; fS; dg) = c (S)
2
; if c (S) is odd:
L 2 L (S) : 8i 2 f1; 2g ;
ci (L; fL (S) ; dg) = c (S)
2
; if c (S) is even:
(43)
From (37), (41), (42) and (43) it follows that
'qo (fS; dg) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
xi 2 S : 8i 2 f1; 2g ;
}i (xi; fS; dg) = c (S)
2
+
1
2
; if c (S) is odd:
L =

1
2
;
1
2
; xi; xj 6=i

2 L (S) :
}i (xi; fS; dg) = }j 6=i (xj 6=i fS; dg) =
=
c (S)
2
; if c (S) is even:
(44)
Thus, in quasiconvex ordinal bargaining games the RBEBS is technically
equivalent to OEBS suggested by Conley and Wilkie (for details, see Conley
and Wilkie 2012).
2.5 Application to n-player ordinal and quasiconvex n-
player ordinal bargaining problems
Let Bo =  I; fA; dg ; figi2I be an ordinal bargaining problem where I =
f1; :::; ng is the set of n  3 players, A is the set of possible agreements and
d = fd1; :::; dng is the disagreement point. Each player i 2 I has a complete,
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transitive and reflexive preference relation i over the set A. Each agreement
xi 2 A is an n-tuple of demands xi = (g1; :::; gn) over some (possibly imperfectly)
divisible resource, the total sum of which is z. Each demand gi of every i 2 I
is selected the interval [di; :::; z]. Let S  A be a subset of feasible agreements
which is defined as follows:
S =
(
x = (g1; :::; gn) 2 S :
X
i2I
gi = z ^ xi i d8i 2 f1; 2g
)
: (45)
From (45) it follows that x 2 S iff x is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that Bo is such that A 6= ; and S  A is finite. Let fS; dg := S[fdg
be the set of considered outcomes. Each player’s preference relation over the
set of possible outcomes is identical to the one defined in a two player case.
A measure of cardinality of the preferred set of alternatives and each player’s
ordinal relative individual advantage gain are defined in the same way as in the
two player case.
Let
P
i2I b
o
i (xi; fS; dg) be the sum of ordinal relative individual advantage
gains associated with some feasible agreement xi 2 S of all the players in the
set I. Suppose that e = (e1; :::; en) 2 S is a strictly egalitarian RBEBS. In that
case, e 2 S should have the following property:
bo1 (e; fS; dg) = bo2 (e; fS; dg) = ::: = bon (e; fS; dg) : (46)
From (46) it follows that the following must be the case for every i 2 f1; :::; ng:
bo1 (e; fS; dg)P
i2I b
o
i (e; fS; dg)
=
bo2 (e; fS; dg)P
i2I b
o
i (e; fS; dg)
= ::: =
bon (e; fS; dg)P
i2I b
o
i (e; fS; dg)
=
1
n
: (47)
Notice that
P
i2I b
o
i (xi; fS; dg) = 1 for any xi 2 S, and so (47) can be simplified
as follows:
bo1 (e; fS; dg) = ::: = bon (e; fS; dg) =
1
n
: (48)
It follows that e 2 S is strictly ordinally egalitarian iff boi (e; fS; dg) = 1n 8i 2 I.
For any two feasible agreements xi 2 S and xj 6=i 2 S, agreement xi =
(g1; :::; gn) is associated with a more equitable distribution of ordinal relative
individual advantage than agreement xj = (h1; :::; hn) iffboi (xi; fS; dg)  1n
 < boi (xj ; fS; dg)  1n
8i 2 I: (49)
The ordinal RBEBS function for n-player ordinal bargaining problems 'o ()
satisfies, for every fS; dg,
'o (fS; dg) 2 arg minxi2S
boi (xi; fS; dg)  1n
8i 2 I : (50)
Recall that boi (xi; fS; dg) = 1  roi (xi; fS; dg)8xi 2 S for every i 2 I. It follows
that e 2 S is a strictly egalitarian solution iff
1  ro1 (e; fS; dg) = ::: = 1  ron (e; fS; dg) ; (51)
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which can be simplified to
ro1 (e; fS; dg) = ::: = ron (e; fS; dg) : (52)
Let
P
i2I r
o
i (xi; fS; dg) denote the sum of ordinal relative concessions associated
with some feasible agreement xi 2 S of all the players in the set I = f1; :::; ng.
If e 2 S is strictly egalitarian, it must be the case that
ro1 (e; fS; dg)P
i2I r
o
i (e; fS; dg)
= ::: =
ron (e; fS; dg)P
i2I r
o
i (e; fS; dg)
=
1
n
: (53)
Since
P
i2I r
o
i (xi; fS; dg) = 1 for every xi 2 S, (53) can be simplified to
ro1 (e; fS; dg) = ::: = ron (e; fS; dg) =
1
n
: (54)
In terms of ordinal relative concessions, the RBEBS function 'o () can be
defined as follows:
'o (fS; dg) = arg minxi2S
roi (xi; fS; dg)  1n
8i 2 I : (55)
The RBEBS can be easily extended to quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problems
with n  3 players. Let Bqo =  I; L (S) ; d; figi2I denote a quasiconvex
ordinal bargaining problem where I = f1; :::; ng is the set of players, L (S) is the
set of lotteries over S  A, d = (d1; :::; dn) is the disagreement point and i is
the preference relation of i 2 I over the set L (S). As in the purely ordinal case,
it is assumed that the preferences of each i 2 I are such that L i d8L 2 L (S).
The set of considered outcomes will be defined as fL (S) ; dg := L (S) [ fdg.
Suppose that the preferences of every i 2 I satisfy AA, PCO , PC , FOSD ,
QC and SDBA axioms. It follows that for each player the preference relation
over the set L (S) can be defined in terms of cardinalities of the preferred sets
of alternatives associated with elements in S  A:
ci (L; fL (S) ; dg) =
X
xi2fx1;:::;xmg
pici (xi; fS; dg) : (56)
The ordinal relative individual advantage gain of every i 2 I can be defined in
the same way as in the two player case:
bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) =
ci (d)  ci (L; fL (S) ; dg)
ci (d)
: (57)
Let
P
i2I b
qo
i (L; fL (S) ; dg) be the sum of ordinal relative individual advantage
gains associated with some lottery L 2 L (S) of all the players in the set I.
Notice that
P
i2I b
qo
i (L; fL (S) ; dg) = 1 for every L 2 L (S). If L 2 L (S) is a
strictly egalitarian solution, it must satisfy the following property:
bqo1 (L; fL (S) ; dg) = ::: = bqon (L; fL (S) ; dg) =
1
n
: (58)
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It follows that L 2 L (S) is strictly egalitarian iff
bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg) =
1
n
: (59)
Let L (S)po  L (S) denote a set of Pareto optimal lotteries over S  A, which
will be defined as follows:
L (S)po = fL 2 L (S) : 8i 2 I;L  L08L0 2 L (S)g : (60)
The RBEBS function for quasiconvex n-player ordinal bargaining problems
'qo () satisfies, for every fL (S) ; dg,
'qo (fL (S) ; dg) arg minL2L(S)po
bqoi (L; fL (S) ; dg)  1n
 8i 2 I : (61)
3 Conclusion
Gauthier’s minimax bargaining solution is based on assumption that bargainers
care not only about their absolute individual benefit gains associated with a par-
ticular agreement, but also about how that agreement is reached, and how the
benefits of a bargaining agreement are distributed among them. In real-world
bargaining problems an agreement can realistically be reached only if at least
one of the bargainers makes a concession – agrees to play a part in implementing
an agreement which is worse than his/her most preferred agreement (i.e. utopia
agreement). Each of the feasible agreements is associated with a specific combi-
nation of concessions that bargainers would have to make in order to reach an
agreement to implement it. Therefore, even if every feasible agreement is mutu-
ally advantageous, the interacting decision-makers may not see them as equally
“fair”: Some of the agreements may require one interacting party to make a
much larger concession than other interacting parties, while other agreements
may be associated with a relatively equitable distribution of concessions among
the interacting parties. If the interacting parties care about the distribution
of concessions, they may evaluate the “fairness” of the agreement on the basis
of interpersonal comparisons of concessions. Gauthier’s minimax bargaining
solution is based on assumption that interacting parties accept an arbitration
scheme which recommends a minimization of the difference between the relative
concessions of interacting parties. Each player’s relative concession associated
with a particular agreement is defined as the difference between player’s Raiffa-
normalized maximum possible payoff (utopia payoff) and the Raiffa-normalized
payoff associated with the agreement. A minimax bargaining solution minimizes
the maximum relative concession among the interacting parties, thus selecting
an agreement which requires equal concessions from the interacting decision-
makers.
In ordinal bargaining games, interacting decision-makers have limited infor-
mation about each other’s preferences over feasible agreements. As a result, a
development of a compelling arbitration scheme for ordinal bargaining problems
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poses significant conceptual challenges. However, as has been argued in this pa-
per, the ordinal information about decision-makers’ preferences is sufficient to
define a very basic measure of relative concessions, based on a simple counting
of players’ preferred agreements. Therefore, purely ordinal information about
preferences is sufficient for an arbitration scheme which recommends the min-
imization of the difference of players’ ordinal relative concessions, and so an
ordinal interpretation of Gauthier’s arbitration scheme is possible.
Gauthier’s arbitration scheme seems to be psychologically compelling: In
the absence of any information about players’ cardinal preferences over out-
comes, a measure of players’ ordinal concessions seems to be one of the few
procedures that could be used to determine the “fairness” of the achieved agree-
ment. Therefore, it seems natural to expect the decision-makers aiming to find
an agreement with the most equitable distribution of concessions to accept an
arbitration scheme based on the principles roughly similar to the ones outlined
in this paper.
As has been shown in this paper, the RBEBS satisfies a number of axioms
which, at least intuitively, should be satisfied by any credible ordinal bargaining
solution: Pareto optimality, individual rationality and invariance under addi-
tions of Pareto irrelevant alternatives. In quasiconvex symtric ordinal bargain-
ing problems, the RBEBS also satisfies the ex ante symmetry axiom. Therefore,
in quasiconvex symmetric bargaining problems, the RBEBS is, in terms of the
symmetry property, equivalent to the OEBS bargaining solution for finite sets
of Pareto optimal points suggested by Conley and Wilkie (2012). However, un-
like OEBS, the RBEBS does not satisfy the symmetry axioms in purely ordinal
games, since the arbitration scheme suggested in this paper does not justify the
use of lotteries in situations where information about decision-makers’ attitudes
towards lotteries is not available to the interacting parties. Further study of the
relationships between RBEBS and other ordinal bargaining solutions, as well
as a study of how the proposed arbitration scheme could be applied to ordi-
nal bargaining games with infinite sets of feasible agreements seem like viable
directions of future research.
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